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OUTLINE OF LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE. By Roscoe Pound. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1943 (Fifth edition). Pp. viii, 244. $3.00.
IT is today acknowledged on all sides that the survival of a vital democracy
requires continuous intelligent discussion of the purposes of our institutions
and of whether existing institutions are effectively serving those purposes.
Such discussion, so far as it relates to our legal institutions, is what has been
called "jurisprudence." That Latin label is unfortunate, for it frightens many
people. We should try to substitute a less forbidding label; perhaps "thor-
ough-going-talk-about-government" would do.
At a time when such talk among American lawyers was none too popular,
Roscoe Pound kept insisting on it. For forty some years he has been busy
on that job. We owe him a great debt.
He first published an outline of such talk in 1903; then he revised it in 1914,
again in 1920, and again in 1938. We now have his latest revision, made in
1943. It is unquestionably the most erudite work of its kind available. Any-
one who wants-and every lawyer should want-to think hard about the
functions of courts, of administrative agencies and of legislation will find this
book an invaluable guide. It will stimulate his thinking and direct him to
books and articles by other men who have done hard thinking about these
subjects from fifth century B. C. Greece to twentieth century Europe and
America, with side glances at similar efforts in the East and the Near East.
Pound's scholarship is almost overwhelming. Unfortunately, at times it
has overwhelmed Pound. It is not true that a man can know too much. To
learn all that others have said about fundamental problems can be a powerful
stimulus to original reflections. It can also be a brake on hasty, superficial
conclusions. But the braking effect may go too far; it may completely stop
the movement of the thinker's own thoughts; and the fear of overlooking
what someone else, somewhere, has said, may have the same consequences.'
1. Hobbes's biographer, Aubrey, reports, "He was wont to say that if he had read
as much as other men, he should have known no more than other men." Quoted in
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Smith ed. 1909) xxv. Cf. SCHOPENHAURE, On Books and Reading
in RELIGION: A DIALOGUE AND OTHER EssAYs (Saunders trans. 1899) 59.
Hazlitt, in 1818, said in an essay "On the Ignorance of the Learned," "The book-
worm wraps himself up in his verbal generalities, and sees only the glimmering shadows
of things reflected from the minds of others. Nature puts him out. The impressions of
real objects, stripped of the disguises of words and voluminous roundabout descriptions,
are blows that stagger him; their variety distracts, their rapidity exhausts him; and he
turns from the bustle, the noise, and glare, and whirling motion of the world about him
. . . to . . . the less startling and more intelligible combinations of the letters of the
alphabet. . . . The habit of supplying our ideas from foreign sources 'enfeebles all in-
ternal strength of thought' as a course of dram-drinking destroys the tone of the stom-
ach." But Hazlitt also said of one learned man, "He was an exception that confirmed
the general rule,--a man that, by uniting talent and knowledge with learning, made the
distinction between them more striking and palpable." SELEcrFD ESSAYS OF WILLIAM
HAZLIr, 1778-1830 (Keynes ed. 1930) 14, 18.
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Pound's own writings reveal that his learning and his dread of overlooking
have sometimes put the brakes on him excessively. To shift the metaphor,
his is a fertile mind; but he has produced too few new Poundian roses for the
amount of fertilizer employed. Pound has been too little creative, consider-
ing his gifts. He has (to change metaphors again) been too much the mere
importer of foreign-made ideas. Yet we should be grateful, for his zeal as
importer has brought us many valuable intellectual goods from other lands.
All of us are likely to be shaped to some extent by our early achievements.
As Bohlen once said,2 Pound's early success as a classifying botanist has in-
fluenced his approach to legal problems. His Outline of Jurisprudence bears
out Bohlen. Here Pound groups writers into "schools" and according to
dates. His botanical classifying obsession is reinforced by his tacit but com-
plete acceptance of the idea, made popular by Hegel, of the "spirit of the
times." Now the fact is that in any period there is no one "time spirit"; there
are many such "spirits." Thinking does not, as Pound seems to believe, go
according to those artificial calendar compartments called "centuries." 3 Look
at Vico, an eighteenth century writer whose theory of history-an "evolu-
tionary" theory-was substantially different from the theories of those think-
ers who are generally regarded as embodying the spirit of the Age of Reason.4
in almost every period there are numerous currents and cross-currents, not
a single drift in one direction; it is only a casual or a one-idea observer who
sees merely one current or singles out the current at the surface., One need
not adopt all President Hutchins's educational theories 0 to agree with him
that it is a mistake to dispose of a philosophy "by placing it in a certain time
and then saying that time is gone." 7
It is unwise, for example, for Pound to pigeon-hole Aristotle. Undoubted-
ly, Aristotle shared some attitudes with other Greek thinkers of his day. But
2. Bohlen, Book Review (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L Ray. 822, 83.
3. See, for instance, Pound's classification, "the seventeenth century" at p. 50.
4. Even they., however, were not as "unhistorical" as they were said to be by many
nineteenth century writers. See, e.g., as to Voltaire, Schevill, PVoltaire in MrNTHOD3 O
SOcIAL. ScrENcE (Rice ed. 1931) 424.
5. Compare comments in Witmark v. Fisher, 125 F. (2d) 949, 964 (C. C. A. 2d,
1942); Hume v. Mloore-MlacCormack Lines, 121 F. (2d) 336, 346 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
6. Pound's Outlindw should fit into a curriculum contrived according to Hutchins's
recently revised attitude. For Hutchins, in his recent book, Education for Freedom,
is breaking away from the authoritarian dogmatism of Mortimer Adler. Thus Hutchins
now calls for "candid and intrepid thinking about fundamental issues:' says that "moral
standards" should be "based on reason and not on precept and authority alone," speal:s
of "democracy as a fighting faith," and actually quotes the pragmatist John Dewey with
approval. HuTcINs, EDUCATION FOR FpEE.om (1943) 32, 63, 91, 95.
7. Id. at 32-33. Yet we need to have in mind that "often the praise of ancient
authors proceeds not from the reverence of the dead but from the competition and mutual
envy of the living. . . .For men contend with the living, not with the dead, to these
ascribing more than due, that they may obscure the glury uf the other." Honcrs,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 48, 395. Cf. AmsmTOm, RnOnrIc, bk. II, c. 10, t the effect
that "we envy those who are near us in time, place, age or reputation" and "do not com-
pete with men who lived centuries ago."
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some of his ideas transcend the boundaries of any school and are as fresh and
vital now as they were in ancient Greece. To regard him merely as an ancient
Greek, or merely as the founder of a "school," is to lose the value of many
of his observations. 8 The same is true of other sprightly minds. We may-we
should--disagree with much of what Hobbes or Machiavelli said; but, as is
often done, to call Hobbes a "Hobbesian" or Machiavelli a "Machiavellian"
is a distortion, and one that blinds us to their flashes of insight which are
still valuably illuminating. It is, accordingly, a deadening and misleading
practice to label Jhering, as Pound does, "a leading representative of the So-
cial-Utilitarians," or G6ny a "neo-scholastic," or-to come closer home-
Thurman Arnold a "psychological realist," Seagle an "historical realist,"
Llewellyn a "sceptical neo-realist," and to shove Holmes into the category of
the "sociological school" in "the stage of unification."
The reader is tempted, just for fun, to try new classifications which would,
for instance, lump together Aristotle's great manual on how to win law suits,
comprising a considerable part of his Rhetoric,9 with Holmes's famous "bad
8. There is, however, a need to be on guard against misinterpreting the "ancients";
the differences between their cultures and ours render it likely that they sometimes used
words in ways we cannot fully comprehend. See FRANX, IF MEN WERE ANGELS (1942)
193-94.
9. Aristotle says that rhetoric deals with the modes of persuasion and includes
"forensic" argument used to persuade judges and juries. "The use of persuasive speech,"
he wrote, "is to lead to decisions." The speaker must, for instance, try to "make his own
character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind."
For when "people . . . feel friendly to the man who comes before them for judgment,
they regard him as having done little wrong, if any. . . . The emotions are all those
feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments . . . such as anger, pity, fear
and the like, with their opposites. . . ." Young men "are ready to pity others, because
they think every one an honest man, or anyhow better than he is: they judge their neigh-
bors by their own harmless motives"; but "elderly men .. . have often been taken ill.
• ..They are cynical; that is, they tend to put the worse construction on everything ...
People always think well of speeches adapted to, and reflecting, their own character;
and we can see how to compose our speeches so as to adapt both them and ourselves to
our audiences." "If you have no witnesses on your side, you will argue that the judges
[or jurors] must decide what is probable. . . . If you have witnesses, and the other
man has not, you will argue that probabilities cannot be put on their trial, and that we
could do without the evidence of witnesses altogether if we need do no more than bal-
ance the pleas advanced on either side." RHEiO~ic, bk. I, cc. 1, 3, 15; bk. II, cc. 1, 12, 13.
It is usually overlooked that one of Aristotle's famous utterances on "natural law"
was made as part of his instructions, in the Rhetoric, concerning law-suit tactics. "If,"
he says, "the written law tells against our case, clearly we must appeal to the universal
law, and insist on its greater equity and justice. We must argue that the juror's oath,
'I will give my verdict according to my honest opinion,' means that one will not simply
follow the letter of the written law. We must urge that the principles of equity are per-
manent and changeless, and that the universal law does not change either, for it is the
law of nature, whereas written laws often do change. . . . Or that the better man is,
the more he will follow and abide by the unwritten law in preference to the written.
.. . If however the written law supports our case, we must urge that the oath 'to give
my verdict according to my honest opinion' is not meant to make the jurors give a ver-
dict that is contrary to the law, but to save them from perjury if they misunderstood
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man" thesis, found in his paper, The Path of the Law, 0 and to collocate parts
of Plato's totalitarian theories, found in his Republic and Laws,," with cur-
rent Nazi writings on government.
Seldom is there a man--outside of an insane asylum-who is all-of-one-
piece, thoroughly consistent. The Freudians have done us some harm in put-
ting over the ideal of the completely "integrated" personality. Happily, al-
most all men-and this is particularly true of most of the great thinkers-
are multiple personalities. Pound himself is by no means a hundred per cent
Poundian; perhaps it is because he thinks he is that he has been insufficiently
aware of his own peculiarly perplexing inconsistencies. 12 In this challeng-
ing book, however, he has stuck pretty steadily to one method: that is both
its vice and its virtue.
JEROME N. FnANrj
what the law really means. . . . Or that trying to be cleverer than the laws is just what
is forbidden by those codes of law that are accounted best." Id., bk. I, c. 15.
10. (1897) 10 H- v. L. REv. 460-61, reprinted in Ho.LsES, Co.EcrTE LEcAL PAPrs
(1920) 172-73. There Holmes said: "Take the fundamental question, What constitutes
the law? You will find some text writers telling you that it is something different from
what is decided by the courts. . ., that it is a system of reason, that it is a deduction from
principles of ethics or admitted axioms or what not, which may or may not coincide with
the decisions. But if we take the view of . .. the bad man we shall find that he does
not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he does want to kmow what
the . . . courts are likely to do in fact. I am much of his mind. The prophecies of what
the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."
(Italics added).
That Holmes was here merely describing the practical consequences of the judicial
process and was not rejecting reason or moral or ideal factors (affecting judges and
others), see FRANK, IF MEN WaNm ANGFLs (1942) 54-59, 297-98, 307-0S.
Of course, Aristotle, too, was intensely interested in reason, morals and ideals as
applied to legal institutions, as shown in his Politics and Ethics.
11, In his ideal state, there was to be rigid censorship; all innovations in the arts were
to be forbidden; men were to be assigned specific jobs and obliged to stick to them;
and the rulers were to "have the privilege of lying" to the citizens "for the public good,"
for they would "find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for the good
of their subjects." REPuBLi, 377, 389, 401, 424, 459. In his later treatise on the prop2r
conduct of a practical state he called not only for rigid censorship and state control of
all details of education but also for state regulation of religious beliefs with severe pun-
ishment of heretics. See, e.g., LAws, 701, 816-17, 907-09.
As to Plato as totalitarian or fascist, see, e.g., CATLIN, SToRY oF THE: POLTICAL
PnmosopiHms (1939) 51 et seq.; SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL TnHE0Y (1937) 41,
81-85; FRANK, IF MEN WinE ANGELS (1942) 192; Corwin, Bouk Review (1940) 54
HAv. L. Rxv. 533. For contrary interpretations, see McILWAi, Co:rsT1Turo;ALsnx,
ANCIENT AND MODERN (1940) 34-35; Morrow, Plato and the Rule of Laz (1940) 14
PHosoPHi. R-v. 105, 105, 126.
12. As to his puzzling inconsistencies, see FRANK, IF IMEr VE A:.o.Ls (1942)
332-41.
1 United States Circuit Judge, Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
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RADIO NETWORKS AND 'rTHE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. By Thomas Porter Rob-
inson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. Pp. iv, 278. $3.50.
THE eternal problem of democratic government is that of reconciling the
freedom of individuals to do as they please with the right of the community
to insist that the good of each must be subordinated to the good of all. This
issue has been posed in its most pressing modern form by the rise of giant
corporations during the era of laissez-faire. Since the advent of Big Business,
one of the major and never-ending tasks of democracy has been the employ-
ment of the police power of the state to the end that corporate interests will
be protected in the carrying on of their legitimate activities and will at the
same time be restrained from exploiting their customers, crushing their com-
petitors, and destroying freedom of the market through unregulated monopoly.
This problem is the only meaningful context within which the current rela-
tions between the Federal Communications Commission and the radio indus-
try can be fruitfully discussed. The chief defect in Dr. Robinson's detailed
analysis of these relations is that he tends to ignore this context, save in his
four page introduction. While it would be unfair to say that he has lost sight
of the forest because of the trees, he has assuredly not attained that illuminat-
ing perspective on his subject matter which would have accompanied a more
constant awareness of the frictions between Business and Government during
the past half century.
He therefore fails to see that much of his material illustrates anew a familiar
pattern: Big Business, in the sacred name of "freedom" and "private rights,"
at first opposes all public regulation; then it challenges the legality and con-
stitutionality of specific controls, often to the tune of loud outcries against
"bureaucrats" and shrill complaints that proposed regulations spell bank-
ruptcy for the business man and slavery for the citizen; and finally, after much
trial-and-error correction of abuses and mistakes on both sides, it comes to
accept reasonable regulation in the public interest as not only inevitable but
even desirable for business itself. This has been the history of every Big
Business in the United States. All enlightened citizens familiar with that his-
tory know that the alleged "tyranny" of Government over Business is in the
end preferable to the actual tyranny of Business over Government (and the
public) which attends a regime of wholly unrestricted profit-seeking by mo-
nopolists. That the radio industry is now in mid-stream in this process is
obvious. Reflective readers may well regret that Dr. Robinson now and then
overlooks the truth of Justice Holmes's dictum that "the vindication of the
obvious is sometimes more important than the elucidation of the obscure."
This treatise is, nevertheless, an extremely useful contribution to the under-
standing of a public issue which has not hitherto been systematically discussed
in book form. Dr. Robinson reviews the history of broadcasting and gives
a good account of the problems and practices of the three great chains-
NBC, CBS and Mutual. He surveys the course of federal regulation dur-
ing the early period of patent controversies and analyzes the development of
the regulatory power under the Communications Act of 1934 which estab-
lished the FCC. His well-balanced treatment of censorship, advertising,
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artist contracts, transcriptions and the various problems of network-station
contracts (e.g., rates, duration, exclusivity, option time, etc.) will be helpful
to public officials and business executives, to lawyers and laymen, and to
broadcasters and auditors.
Dr. Robinson's pages are judiciously "objective" in style and apparent
intent. Yet in their total effect they will impress informed and critical read-
ers as a kind of brief for NBC and CBS in their long battle against the
regulations issued in 1941 by Chairman James Lawrence Fly with the ap-
proval of a majority of the commissioners. This brief is far from persuasive.
Like the spokesmen for the two major chains, the author contends, with no
convincing proof, that the 1941 regulations are "destructive to chain broad-
casting itself." He argues that the goal of more competition can better be
achieved by "a greater available supply of frequencies for commercial broad-
casting which in turn would result in a greater number of national networks."
He minimizes the demonstrated willingness of the FCC to amend regulations
in accordance with changing technological and business conditions. He ig-
nores altogether, save in his bibliography, the two White Papers issued by
Mutual in support of the new regulations.
The author's predilections are also revealed in lesser ways: his wholly
unsupported allegation that governmental control of radio "shows a trend
toward totalitarianism"; his statement that 'Mr. Fly "raises up a specter of net-
work monopoly"; his reliance upon Westbrook Pegler as a witness against
Mr. Petrillo; and his accusation, supported by nothing save a quotation from
Senator Wheeler, that the FCC "can be fairly charged with political bia_
and favoritism in the past." On the other hand, he shows how the contro-
versial regulations grew out of an exhaustive inquiry undertaken in 1938
not on the initiative of the FCC but on the demand of Congress, many of
whose members saw tendencies toward monopoly in the practices of the net-
works. He also exposes, perhaps inadvertently', some of the curious logic of
NBC and CBS in their efforts to defend essentially monopolistic prac-
tices. His principle quarrel with the FCC is based on the contention that
its regulations emphasize "station sovereignty" at the expense of chain broad-
casting and therefore promote "the wrong type of competition." His case for
federal licensing of networks, as well as of individual stations, is a persuasive
one.
It is unfortunate that Dr. Robinson's book went to press in February. Had
he waited but a few months longer, he might well have altered certain of his
judgments, for he would have been able to discuss recent developments which
are only foreshadowed in his pages. On May 10, the Supreme Court put an
end to the five-year struggle of NBC and CBS against public control by
upholding the right of the FCC to regulate the radio chains under the Act
of 1934. More recently the Blue Network has been sold by NBC to inde-
pendent owners. And ever since February the enemies of the FCC have been
attacking the agency through the Cox Committee's so-called "investigation"
in a fashion which is a stench in the nostrils of all citizens who cherish hon-
esty, integrity and ordinary decency on the part of their lav-makers. These
events, all of which have their counterparts in past battles against monopoly,
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are an integral part of the story Dr. Robinson has tried to tell. When he
includes them in his next edition, if any, lie may also conclude that the FCC
has served "public interest, convenience and necessity" far better than he be-
lieved was the case when he completed this volume.
FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN t
THE LABOR RELATIONS ACT IN THE COURTS. By Herbert 0. Eby. New
York: Harper and Bros., 1943. Pp. xvii, 250. $3.50.
THE fate of social legislation in this country, as Justice Frankfurter once
remarked, rests ultimately with our judges.' Even when our courts do not
slay a statute in one fell decision, they may condemn it to a lingering death
or bind it hand and foot in a web of statutory construction. If, however, our
courts look with favor upon a statute, they will brook no legalistic evasions
or circumventions and will be adroit to assist in fulfilling both its express and
undeclared purposes.
The National Labor Relations Act is peculiarly subject to this judicial favor
or disfavor since, unlike the rulings of some other administrative agencies, the
orders of the National Labor Relations Board are not self-enforcing. Not
only is there no penalty for the violation of an order of the Board, but the
order itself is a mere exhortation unless and until the Board has petitioned a
United States circuit court of appeals to embody the order in one of its de-
crees.2 For only one type of order, that requiring an employer to reinstate
discharged employees, is any incentive provided by the Act to induce employer
compliance in advance of a circuit court decree. This sole statutory incentive
or sanction is that "back pay" due discharged employees continues to accu-
mulate while the order remains unobeyed.
The Act consequently has been subject to a judicial scrutiny unprecedented
in our legal history. Since April 12. 1937, when the constitutionality of the
Act was upheld,3 the United States Supreme Court has handed down no less
than 47 decisions interpreting the Act ;4 in the October, 1940, term alone, it
issued 11 such decisions. Even more striking are the circuit court cases. Be-
tween June 15, 1936, when the first decision involving the validity of a Board
order was handed down, and April 1, 1943, there has been a total of 419 such
t Professor of Government, Williams College.
1. See LAW AND POLITICS, OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1939) 4.
2. Of the 54 unfair labor practices cases reported in Volume I of the Board's deci-
sions, no less than 19 had to be reviewed by the circuit courts.
3. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937).
4. The Interstate Commerce Act adopted in 1887 did not receive its first Supreme
Court test until 1892, and during the next 10 years came before the Supreme Court only
12 times; the Federal Trade Commission Act, which became law in 1914, waited 6 years
for its initial Supreme Court review, and in the succeeding 10 years was passed upon by
that Court in only 21 additional cases. See Committee Investigating Labor Board, pur-
suant to H. R. 258, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) NLRB exhibits 64, 65.
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cases. 5 This total comprises only decisions relating to the validity of final
orders of the Board; excluded are decisions relating to injunctions, motions,
interrogatories, subpoenas, representation cases, contempt proceedings, and
consent decrees. 7 Nor is there any likelihood of any diminution of this mighty
flood. As of April 1, 1943, there were pending in the circuit courts no less
than 101 petitions either to enforce or set aside final orders of the Board.8
The Board on the whole has achieved a singular record of success in the
courts. 9 No part of the Act had even prior to the Jones and Laughlin deci-
sion ever been deemed unconstitutional by any circuit court. Although before
April 12, 1937, not a single federal judge had held the Act applicable to manu-
facturing enterprises,'0 since that date in only three cases has the Board's
jurisdiction over any enterprise been questioned; and in two of these the
United States Supreme Court reversed the circuit court.1 One circuit court
has even stated: "In the light of the expanding concept of interstate com-
merce, and of circumstances under which the impact of industrial strife bur-
den and obstruct such commerce, it is now futile to renew assault already
repeatedly repelled upon the jurisdiction of the Board." 12
In deciding questions of law, the circuit courts have on the whole displayed
a liberal attitude toward the Act. Instead of a literal reading of the statute,
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See NLRB Release No. R-5390 (1943).
6. Until the decision in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41 (1938),
no less than 95 suits were filed by employers in various district courts throughout the
country seeking to enjoin the hearings provided for by the Act. For an account of this
early struggle, see NLRB FIRST ANNUAL REPoRT (1930) 46-49; NLRB SEcozai Az..,;UAL
REPORT (1937) 21-26.
7. A total of 639 such decrees were entered as of July 1, 1942.
S. Information obtained from the Litigation Division of the NLRB.
9. As of July 1, 1942, the circuit courts had passed upo, n the validity of 345 Board
orders, enforcing 174 in full, modifying 115, and setting aside 56t. Many of the modifica-
tions were trifling.
10. There was not even a dissenting opinion to console the advocates of increased
national power.
11. See NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U. S. 318 (1940), rezg 106 F. (2d)
119 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601 (1939), rez,'g 98 F. (2d) 615
(C. C. A. 3d, 1938); NLRB v. Idaho-Maryland Mines Corp., 98 F. (2d) 129 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1938). The employer in the last named case operated a gold and silver mine in
California, all of the products of which were shipped to the United States mint located
in that state. The Board did not petition for certiorari.
12. See NLRB v. Colten, 105 F. (2d) 179, 181 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939).
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the judiciary has followed the Board's lead and has approved the orders which
have been devised to remedy the practices the Board was commanded to pre-
vent. Perhaps one reason for the liberal reading the circuit courts have given
the Act is the vigilance the Supreme Court has exercised to prevent any sterili-
zation of the Board's powers. Thus intervention of the Supreme Court was
required to clarify and guarantee the Board the power: to order disestab-
lishment of company-dominated unions ;13 to compel the reinstatement of em-
ployees who had engaged in a strike not caused by unfair labor practices ;14
to forbid an employer to discriminate against union men in hiring new em-
ployees ;1' to compel the employer to reduce to writing any agreement reached
with a union ;16 to direct the reinstatement of employees who had obtained
equivalent employment elsewhere ;17 to set aside closed-shop contracts executed
after the contracting union had received the illegal assistance of the employer ;18
and to determine its own election procedures without judicial interference. 10
On several occasions, however, the Supreme Court has modified or reversed
decisions of the various circuit courts upholding Board orders.20
An indication of the Court's concern over the proper interpretation of the
Act is the readiness with which it has granted certiorari even though questions
13. See NLRB v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 272 (1938), rez'g 91 F. (2d)
458 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines; 303 U. S. 261 (1938),
rev'g 91 F. (2d) 178 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937).
14. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333 (1938), rev'g 92
F. (2d) 761 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
15. See NLRB v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 313 U. S. 177 (1941), modifying 113 F. (2d)
202 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) ; the First Circuit had, however, in NLRB v. Waumbec Mills,
114 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940), upheld the Board's exercise of this power prior to
the Supreme Court decision.
16. See H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 514 (1940) ; this power had been denied
by the Seventh Circuit in Inland Steel v. NLRB, 109 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940),
but had been upheld by the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits.
17. See NLRB v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 313 U. S. 177 (1941), inodifyiNg 113 F. (2d)
202 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) ; the Ninth Circuit had taken a contrary position in NLRB v,
Carlisle Lumber, 99 F. (2d) 533, 537 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), but the view of the Supreme
Court had been anticipated by the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits.
1"8. See NLRB v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 315 U. S. 685 (1942), re.Vg 120 F.
(2d) 611 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941), but the view of the Supreme Court had been anticipated
in International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 110 F. (2d) 29 (App. D. C. 1939).
19. See NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U. S. 453 (1940), re,'g 106 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A.
7th, 1939). See also NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 308
U. S. 413 (1940), decided the same day as the Falk case; A. F. of L. v. NLRB, 308 U. S.
401 (1940).
20. See Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U. S. 31 (1942), vnodifying 120 F.
(2d) 505 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177 (1941),
modifying 113 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) (as to calculation of back pay) ; NLRB
v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U. S. 426 (1941), modifying 111 F. (2d) 588 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1940) (as to scope of order) ; Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 7 (1940),
modifying 114 F. (2d) 820 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) (as to calculation of back pay); Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197 (1938), modifying 95 F. (2d) 390 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1938).
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of fact are involved. As Mr. justice Black has pointed out, the Supreme
Court does "not ordinarily grant certiorari to review judgments based solely
upon [such] questions .... ,,"21 As of April 1, 1943, the Board's petition for
certiorari had been granted in 29 cases and denied in only 4.2- Although re-
spondents do not fare so well, certiorari was granted in their petitions in 19
out of 78 cases, a ratio still somewhat higher than the one in five chance the
average petitioner for certiorari has.2
The circuit courts have not, however, displayed the same support of the
Board in cases in which the sole problem was whether the Board's findings
were supported by substantial evidence, accepting with difficulty Chief Jus-
tice Stone's dictum that "courts are not the only agency that must be assumed
to have capacity to govern." 24 The doctrine of "administrative finality" which
limits the range of issues open to judicial review to "questions affecting con-
stitutional power, statutory authority and the basic requisites of proof" 2 met
with grudging recognition in the circuit courts. "[Some courts] though pro-
fessing adherence to this mandate, honored it we think with lip service only.
In form the court determined that the finding . . .had no support whatever.
In fact what the court did was to make its own appraisal of the testimony,
picking and choosing for itself among uncertain and conflicting inferences.
Statute and decision forbid that exercise of power." 2
The Board has repeatedly protested in petitions for certiorari to the Su-
preme Court that the courts below were substituting their judgment for the
Board's in appraising testimony. In asking the Supreme Court to review the
decision of the Fifth Circuit in Waterman Steamship Corp. v,. NLRB,-7 the
Board stated that its petition for certiorari was "grounded upon the apparently
consistent failure of the court below in the present decision and in its other
decisions rendered during the past two years to give effect to the provision
of the Act that the findings of the Board as to facts if supported by evidence,
shall be conclusive." 28 After an elaborate recital of the testimony, justice
Black speaking for a unanimous court held that "all of the Board's findings,
far from resting on mere suspicion, are supported by evidence which is sub-
stantial." "The Court of Appeals' failure to enforce the Board's order re-
sulted from the substitution of its judgment on disputed facts for the Board's
judgment and power to do that has been denied the Court by Congress." 1
21. See NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U. S. 206, 203 (1940).
22. See NLRB -. Express Publishing Co., S17 U. S. 676 (1942) (on contempt);
DuPont v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 571 (1941); NLRB v. Peninsular & Occidental Stcanuhip
Corp., 305 U. S. 653 (193S); NLRB v. Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co., 302 U. S.
738 (1937).
23. See Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at the Octolcr Terms 1937 and
1938 (1940) 53 HIfv. L. Rav. 579.
24. See United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 87 (1936).
25. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125 (1939).
26. Mr. Justice Cardozo, in FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S. 67 (1934).
27. 103 F. (2d) 157 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
28. See Brief in Petition for Certiorari, p. 18, Waterman Steamship Corp. v. XLRB,
103 F. (2d) 157 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
29. See NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U. S. 206 (1940).
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In NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Association,"0 Justice Black, again speaking for
a unanimous Court,3' reversed the court below and observed that the courts
as well as the Board must "act as Congress has required." Justice Black
contrasted the manner in which "the Board and its representatives solicitously
guarded respondent's and intervenor's right to a full and fair hearing with the
Court of Appeals' failure to give proper regard to the evidence which was
before the Board."
In Link-Belt Company v. NLRB,82 the Board argued that to sustain the
action of the court below would substantially jeopardize enforcement of the
Act in the Seventh Circuit, an important industrial area. The Supreme Court
in a unanimous decision 33 reversed the circuit court, holding that "the Court
of Appeals in reaching that conclusion substituted its judgment on disputed
facts for the Board's judgment. . . ." 34
Of course, this judicial reluctance to grant conclusiveness to administrative
findings supported by substantial evidence is not limited to the findings of
the Board alone. We are now witnessing a struggle 35 between administrative
agencies and courts, comparable in scope and importance to the seventeenth
century conflict between common law and equity. The Board's chances of
obtaining more respect for its findings and the orders based thereon depend
upon the outcome of that battle.
One turns hopefully therefore to a book entitled The Labor Relations Act
in the Courts, announced by its publishers as "A Five-Year Survey and
Analysis of Legal Decisions Affecting the Rights and Responsibilities of Em-
ployers and Employees," for the long-awaited and sorely needed definitive
treatise on the judicial history of the Act. Mr. Eby's work is a far cry from
such a treatise.
His book is nothing more than a collection of excerpts from about two hun-
dred judicial opinions on the Act preceded by a brief digest of the material
facts in the cases quoted, arranged in what the author conceived to be logical
fashion. Each of the fourteen subdivisions of this collection is prefaced by one
to three pages of background material. The discussion of the decisions is con-
fined to footnote references to other cases interpreting the Act. There are no
references to decisions involving other administrative agencies, no references
to the wealth of non-legal materials buried in Congressional reports, no allu-
30. 310 U. S. 318 (1940).
31. Mr. Justice McReynolds did not participate.
32. 110 F. (2d) 506 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
33. Mr. Justice McReynolds did not participate.
34. See NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S. 584 (1941). The Supreme Court was,
nevertheless, thereafter twice impelled in brief per curiam opinions to reverse the same
circuit court because it persisted in "weighing evidence" in reviewing Board orders. See
NLRB v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 315 U. S. 282 (1942); NLRB v,
Nevada Consolidated Copper Co., 316 U. S. 105 (1942).
35. In NLRB v. Thompson Products, 97 F. (2d) 13, 17 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938), Judge
Hamilton stated: "The Board's findings in these cases tends to destroy the purpose of
the Labor Relations Act and to prompt discord between employer and employee. .. ."
See Hearings of the Committee on Education and Labor on S. 1000, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1939) 1465, 2150, 2197.
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sions to other treatises or even to the great number of useful law review arti-
cles.
What discussion there is of the principles announced by ie courts is e--
ceedingly superficial. The chapter entitled "Due Process" does not even cite
any of the Morgan cases dealing with the requirements of a fair hearing 0
or even refer to the three cases in which the circuit courts held the hearing
before the trial examiner to have been unfair. The troublesome question of
successor company unions is treated without referring to those cases in which
the court reversed the Board on the issue of successorship3 7 Finally, the
entire problem of contempt of court decrees enforcing Board orders is com-
pletely ignored.
The book not only lacks an index, but the arrangement of cases is contra-
dictory and confused.
The Labor Relations Act In tie Courts is, therefore, neither a digest, a
treatise, a survey, nor an analysis of the court decisions interpreting the Act.
WILL MASLOW -
YANKEE LAWYER: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF EPHRAIM TuTT. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943. Pp. xiii, 451. $3.50.
To review the book of a friend is inevitably a delicate and ofttimes a danger-
ous task. There should be no traffic between author and critic, otherwise the
latter may be accused of reading into its pages something that is not there.
This is doubly true in the present instance since it was I who originally
suggested to Mr. Tutt the desirability of writing his reminiscences and finally
overcame his objection to joining, as he put it, the galaxy of vainglorious
old fools who rush into print with the result that their old age becumes a
laughing-stock instead of a tranquil prelude to a deserved oblivion. Having
done so, I confess that I looked forward to the publication of Yankee Lawyer
with a distinct feeling of responsibility and no little apprehension.
But my fears proved unfounded. Although I had watched Ephraim Tutt
in court, played poker and gone fishing with him for over forty years, I
was wholly unprepared for the wealth of pungent narrative and the richness
of human philosophy which his entertaining autobiography contains. In fact,
I saw him in his full intellectual and moral stature for the first time. I have
nothing to blame myself for in persuading him to tell the story of his life,
which he has done with a good deal of literary skill and as much modesty as
is possible when willy nilly he is the hero of most of its episodes. After
36. See Mforgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 463 (1936), 304 U. S. 1 (1933), 307
U. S. 183 (1939), 313 U. S. 409 (1941).
37. Compare DuPont v. NLRB, 116 F. (2d) 388 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940), cert. dcied,
313 U. S. 571 (1941).
Trial Examiner, National Labor Relations Board. The views expressed herein
represent the personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Board.
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all, Mr. Tutt would indeed be an old fool if he were not aware that he had
more on the ball than most of his contemporaries at the bar. He has sought
to explain his character as moulded by his experience; he has done so with
conspicuous success; surely it was worth doing; and if I be accused of bias,
I need only point out that his distinctly acidulous comments upon myself
more than balance the scales. The sad truth is that I think a great deal more
of Mr. Tutt than he does of me. Time and again in the pages of Yankee
Lawyer he makes it quite plain that he regards me as a conscienceless literary
hack who has misrepresented his true character and distorted the facts of the
cases in which he has taken part. In fact, he has used such expressions about
me that I have been tempted to sue him for libel per se; he has gone so far
as to accuse me of manufacturing stories about him out of whole cloth. Well,
perhaps I have, and turn about is fair play; but, at any rate, he has more
than evened things up. He has now set everything right, and his picture of
himself and of -his time is exact and in its proper frame.
And what an engrossing and engaging picture it is-of this farmer's boy
who worked his way through college and law school, won his spurs in a
country town and later achieved eminence at the New York Bar l Yet it is
the story of hundreds and perhaps thousands of young Americans who go
forth to put their fortune to the touch in a big city "to win or lose it all."
Ephraim Tutt won professional and financial success, but he won far more-
the respect and affection of his fellows. What a curious contrast between
him and his boyhood friend Calvin Coolidge-the warm-hearted, impulsively
generous humanitarian, and the cautious, grim, thrifty politician I What made
these two Vermonters, born within twelve miles of one another, so different?
Was it Eph's Irish mother with her belief in pixies? Was there a prenatal
influence that gave and still gives Eph his occasional impish waywardness?
Or was it his devotion to the lovely and gentle Esther of whom I had never
heard until I opened my friend's presentation copy? What a strange love
story for these realistic days! Suppose it had happened now instead of nearly
fifty years ago. Would they have hesitated to take the step that then seemed
so unthinkable ? Each reader must decide that for himself ; but, if in the nega-
tive, he should also ask himself whether in the end Ephraim Tutt would
have developed into the man he did.
The lawyer, qua lawyer, will find much matter for argument in these pages.
In his chapter "The Lawv-Model T" the author, like his friend the late John
H. Wigmore, spares no punches in his castigation of the hide-bound pre-
cedents with which it is encrusted. Here, perhaps, the old fellow is at his
best. But he is a firm believer in law as such without which, as he acknowl-
edges, civilization could not exist; he merely attacks the subterfuges and dis-
simulations by which it is at present administered. His own legal philosophy
is set forth at some length in "The Legal Cavalcade" in which he shows
himself, like Roscoe Pound, an advanced favorer of its socialization, while re-
ducing its complex and cumbersome machinery and the multitude of regu-
lations that entangle the ordinary citizen in their web. He believes that the
truest democracy is that society in which the individual is allowed to exercise
the utmost freedom of thought and action consistent with order and that
the -higher the civilization, the fewer laws it will need and the more it will
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rely upon sympathy, kindness and loyalty-what Lord Moulton calls "self
imposed law"--and that so far as we have any real justice in this world,
we get it less through the courts than by virtue of the inherent decency of our
fellowmen. There is also food for thought on the part of tle legal profession
in the chapter entitled "The Law and Literature" where the effects of the
legal training upon the habits of mind and expression of the brethren is
discussed with humor and insight. It might have been called "Why Lawyers
Can't Write" !
During the last quarter century that Mr. Tutt has so good naturedly
permitted me to use him as a character in what was otherwise largely fiction
I have occasionally been disturbed by the possibility that some people might
think him merely a figment of my imagination. That ghost, I am glad to say,
has now been laid. Ephraim Tutt's actuality is established forever-at least
for all those who are not such constitutional skeptics that they are prepared
to question the authenticity of any alleged fact of history, like the man who
wrote an erudite work proving that Napoleon Bonaparte never existed. In
any event, to paraphrase Voltaire's famous aphorism, "If Mr. Tutt did not
exist, it would be necessary to invent him."
ARTHUR TRAIN'
ROLLS OF THE GLOUCESTERSHIRE SESSIONS OF THE PEACE, 1361-98. Edited
by Elizabeth Guernsey Kimball. Transactions of the Bristol and Glou-
cestershire Archaeological Society, Volume LXII (1940). Kendal: Titus
Wilson and Son, 1942. Pp. 185. $3.00.
SOME SESSIONS OF THE PEACE IN CAMBRIDGESHIRE IN THE FOURTEENTH
CENTURY, 1340, 1380-83. Edited by Mary Margaret Taylor. Cambridge
Antiquarian Society, octavo publications, No. LV (1942). Cambridge:
Bowes and Bowes, 1942. Pp. lxxii, 76. $3.00.
FRoM a legal standpoint the most interesting of the four Gloucestershire
rolls, edited by Miss Kimball, is the latest (1395-98). Not really a roll, this
collection of material hastily compiled for a visit of the King's Bench to
Gloucester illustrates procedure in the peace sessions in unusual detail. Es-
pecially interesting is the record of the protracted trials of various offenders
against the statute of 1394 protecting salmon. We even learn how six buckets
of little fish, caught by means of illegal weirs in the Severn, were brought
into court and assigned to the poor and to prisoners in Gloucester castle.
Analysis of offenses on these rolls reveals the usual types. About half the
felonies were grand larcenies; and over half the trespasses, assaults. Although
rape, when prosecuted by indictment, had been made a felony in 1285, it was
occasionally presented as a trespass. Of eight Gloucestershire cases, seven
were presented as felonies and one as a trespass. The rolls throw further
light on the knotty problem of the fourteenth century attitude towards ac-
t Member of the New York Bar.
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cessories. An instance of an accessory to a trespass is here added to the one
found by Miss Kimball in her recently published edition of the Warwickshire
and Coventry peace rolls. These two instances controvert Professor Holds-
worth's statement, based on the Year Books, that there could be no accessory
to a trespass. Again Professor Holdsworth maintains that, during this period,
the accessory at the fact was coming to be considered as a principal. In the
three instances of aid of this kind on these rolls "the accomplice was pre-
sented as an accessory rather than as a principal, and treated as such by the
king's bench." 1
Miss Kimball has given us a fine edition of these rolls, preceded by an ade-
quate and lucid commentary. Certain minor criticisms occur to the reviewer.
In the interests of clarity, cross references for the same offense presented by
two different hundred juries or for the results in the King's Bench of two
indictments for the same man would have been desirable. Unfortunately
the editor, so well provided with the names of most presenting jurors, did
not search for pertinent data to bring out the position of the jurors in their
respective communities, or note the interesting recurrence of the names of
the same man or members of the same family over long periods of years.
Miss Kimball cites evidence that the justices were collecting fines for tres-
passes, that in 1396 they took sureties of the peace, and that four justices
in 1361 investigated an attempt to defraud the executors of a will. More
detail on these points would have been welcome.
The later of the two Cambridgeshire rolls (1380-83), edited by Miss Tav-
lor, is made up of only thirty-three undetermined indictments. Like the three
earlier Gloucestershire rolls, it more nearly resembles the usual type of extant
peace roll. Its chief interest lies in the indictments for crimes committed
during the Great Revolt of 1381.
The earlier Cambridgeshire roll (1340) is one of three rolls extant for
the early years of Edward III. The other two are a Somerset roll published
by Professor Putnam in Proceedings before the Justices of the Peace, Edward
III to Richard II (1938), and an unpublished Lancashire roll. In even greater
detail than the latest Gloucestershire roll, this Cambridgeshire roll illustrates
procedure in the peace sessions. Its special character may be attributed to
the peculiar circumstances of its compilation and preservation, which Miss
Taylor, in convincing fashion, connects with the constitutional crisis of 1341.
The roll contains inter alia: suits, initiated by bill, by writ or by indictment,
most of them past the presentment stage; writs to secure the appearance of
jurors or of offenders; returns of the sheriff; determinations of both felonies
and trespasses.
Mention can be made of only a few arresting details. Several suits begun
by bill are described, though unfortunately with too little elaboration of the
steps in the process. The instructions to one jury suggest the beginning of
the process of indictment by a "grand jury" and trial by a "petit jury" "
Three pleas of trespass begun in the King's Bench were removed into
the peace sessions. Three cases afford evidence to modify the opinion that





Mliss Taylor has ably presented the text of both rolls. Her introduction tt)
the rolls is less adequate. Though thoroughly familiar with the political and
constitutional background and with Mkiss Putnam's studies, she often fails
to bring out clearly the significant points abo ut the Cambridgeshire rolls and
to relate them to other published peace rolls. MNany details such as those on
the oath and payment of the justices-subjects on which the Cambridge
material sheds no light-might profitably have been omitted. Her discussion
of the commissions is confusing and gives no succinct list, with references to
the Patent rolls. While one commission, that of 1338, is enrolled, useful
references to published models of later commissions are frequently omitted.
Possibly the justices assigned to hear and determine felionas CI prodicioncs -
were acting under a special commission issued after the revolt. Miss
Taylor gives a good account of the experiment in local "election"
resulting in the commission of 1338, but does not note the significance of the
documents on the peace roll excluding the justices from the bishop of Ely's
liberty, though their commissions gave them jurisdiction infra liberiales. She
remarks 4 that "in common with the other two surviving rolls under
the commissions of 1338," the distinction of the Cambridgeshire roll lies
in the number of suits of the party brought by writ for common law offenses.
This is certainly not true as regards the Somerset roll which contains only
presentments by jurors. The reviewer has no knowledge of the unpublished
Lancashire roll. Repeated returns of the sheriff that a venire- facias came too
late for execution hardly seem to constitute a trespass on the part of jurors.5
Even though they contain practically no "economic" cases, the rolls pub-
lished in these volumes are of value not only to the legal historian but to the
economic and social historian as well. After 1350 the part played by the
justices of the peace in enforcing economic legislation became increasingly
important, and the scarcity of economic cases can only be explained on the
valid assumption that the justices determined such indictments in sessb in.
Excluding ten offenses against the statute on salmon, Miss Kimball found
only four "economic" offenses on the Gloucestershire rolls. Yet these rolls
give vivid economic and social details. We note, inter alia, pans, peacocks,
pigs and pots under "prices of goods stolen" in the excellent index prepared
by lr. Roland Austin, F.S.A., editor of Transaclions. A flourishing
"racket" appears in the indictment of two men who canvassed the country-
side, saying they were proctors of a monastery and collecting alms to the
value of 1C0 shillings per year, which they kept. The rolls contain scattered
references to the iron-mining, farming, sheep-raising and wool manufacture
of Gloucestershire, forest, vale and hill, so well described in the introduction.
The reviewer wonders at the statement 6 that, with some exceptions,
the people on these rolls probably represent the rank and file of the middle-
class population.
The references to economic and social matters on the Cambridgeshire rolls
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going by water to the famous Barnwell fair. Of outstanding importance are
the indictments of rebels in the peace sessions. Miss Taylor's introduction
gives little conception of the economic and social background of medieval
Cambridgeshire, and dismisses the Great Revolt in two or three sentences.
When, for example, in the indictment of the notorious Wiliam Gore, Miss
Taylor refers to subsequent proceedings in the King's Bench, the uninitiated
reader, wondering if this is a new rebel come to light, is not informed that
R~ville and others had already used the King's Bench material or that Gore
was one of four Cambridgeshire rebels excluded from the general amnesty.
She publishes in Appendix III a noteworthy chancery document illustrating
how a justice of the peace took sureties of the peace from the mayor ot
Cambridge and fifteen other men early in 1381, a few months before the re-
volt. She seems unaware that this document throws interesting light not only
on the character of the mayor, who pleaded after the revolt that he was
"forced" to lead an attack on the Priory of Barnwell, but also on the hostility
towards the justices of the peace which was one cause of the revolt. Miss
Taylor might well have amplified her modest conclusion that these rolls
"illustrate many aspects of life in the middle ages."
ELIZABETH CHAPIN FURBER
